The breadth and dynamics of the recent financial crisis have led to efforts to develop forward-looking tools to monitor systemic risk. In this paper we propose a new measure which is an extension of the absorption ratio (AR) introduced in Kritzman et al. (2010) . Using principal component analysis (as in the original AR methodology) in conjunction with a structural model of default we develop a measure of systemic risk that may be calculated using only publicly available data. We call our new measure the credit absorption ratio (CAR). We find that increases in the CAR preceded periods of financial distress during the recent crisis. The CAR may be interpreted economically: it highlights states of the financial system during which the credit fundamentals of institutions and markets exhibit heightened coupling and higher potential for cascading distress. We also demonstrate that a byproduct of CAR analysis provides a measure of the degree to which specific financial institutions are exposed to systemic risk factors at any point in time. We find that a number of the institutions that exhibited high potential exposure under our measure during the lead-up to the recent crisis subsequently experienced higher levels of distress or required external assistance.
Introduction
The Financial Crisis of [2007] [2008] [2009] highlighted the importance of proactive systemic risk measurement. This paper discusses a practical approach to measuring systemic risk both regionally and globally using only publicly available data. The approach may also be used to assess the degree to which individual financial institutions are exposed to systemic risks at any given time.
Measuring systemic risk often requires gaining insight into the degree to which failures of one financial institution may coincide with failures of other financial institutions. This may occur due, for example, to counterparty relationships between the firms; to the exposure of several firms to similar asset classes which may become impaired; or to the pursuit of similar trading strategies which may converge. A key challenge in identifying instances of such coupling between firms is the difficulty in obtaining detailed information on counterparty exposures and portfolio holdings at the institutional level (cf., Stein, 2013) . This challenge has led to the development of tools that take advantage of publicly available data rather than requiring more detailed private data.
For example, Billio et al. (2010) demonstrate how various econometric measures can be applied to publicly available data to arrive at measures of systemic risk. The authors go on to demonstrate how network analysis may be combined with these approaches to provide insight to the extent to which financial industries may become more interconnected.
As another example, two related approaches, Acharya et al. (2010) and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) , take a portfolio-based view of the financial markets and employ tools related to those used in portfolio management. These authors use market variants of VaR and VaR-related measures to proxy for the systemic importance of individual institutions within the financial system. Under these approaches a firm's systemic risk is measured directly with respect to the volatility of its equity (or CDS spreads or other market observables) and the relationship between movements in these values to those of other firms. The goal of these approaches is to indirectly measure the likelihood of joint distress of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and to then identify the firms that contribute most substantially to joint losses across many firms. Such rare instances of high loss across many firms can be implicitly considered to be systemic events.
A comprehensive review of the literature on systemic risk measurement is beyond the scope of this article but a fuller treatment may be found in e.g., Bisias et al. (2012) and the references therein.
In this paper we extend the work of Kritzman et al. (2010) which provides a detailed analysis demonstrating how principal component analysis (PCA) can be used to measure systemic risk. The authors examine a broad cross section of market index returns to determine the degree to which movements in these can be explained by a small number of statistical factors. Kritzman et al. (2010) uses the percentage of total variance explained by a small number of principal components as a measure of systemic risk and derive a measure they term the absorption ratio or AR. The authors report that the absorption ratio is able to highlight periods of market fragility in advance of adverse market events. For example, they present evidence that the absorption ratio appeared to rise in advance of the U.S. housing market bubble as well as coinciding with a number of other historical global financial market dislocations.
We extend the absorption ratio framework in a number of dimensions in order to focus more specifically on the fragility of the financial sector. To this end, rather than examining broad market indices, we restrict our attention to individual firms within the financial sector. In addition, we impose a credit modeling framework on the analysis to highlight instances of potentially higher risk of cascading credit events. To do this, we analyze implied asset returns derived from a structural model of default.
Using principal component analysis (as in the original AR methodology), we develop a measure of systemic risk that may be calculated using only publicly available data that we call the credit absorption ratio (CAR). Our empirical results suggest that implied asset values, suitably transformed into a CAR, provide potentially useful information about systemic risk. We find that increases in the CAR preceded periods of financial distress during the recent crisis and that these behaviors vary by region.
The CAR also enjoys an economically intuitive interpretation due to its relationship to structural models of default. Economically, the CAR highlights states of the financial system during which the credit fundamentals of institutions and markets exhibit heightened coupling and therefore a higher potential for cascading distress. Said differently, the CAR highlights periods in which various drivers of financial firm-level credit risk converge to a much smaller number of "meta-factors."
We can also use a byproduct of CAR analysis, the weights of individual firms' implied asset returns on the first principal component, to examine the susceptibility of individual financial institutions to systemic fragility at a given point in time. We demonstrate this by analyzing a number of financial institutions and give examples of several of those that exhibited high susceptibility (under our measure) during the lead-up to the recent crisis and that subsequently experienced higher levels of distress or required external assistance during the crisis. Furthermore, the timing of rises in these exposure levels appears to align with key events for those firms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the calculation of the CAR and also provides background on both the original AR of Kritzman et al. (2010) as well as the credit model that we use to extend it. Section 3 presents our empirical results on both the broad market application of the CAR and its application to individual firms. In this section, we also provide detail on the data set we used in our empirical work. There are a number of limitations in our approach, and we discuss these in Section 4. We summarize and offer concluding comments in Section 5.
The Credit Absorption Ratio (CAR)
The credit absorption ratio is an extension of the absorption ratio (Kritzman et al., 2010) with modifications to accommodate a credit (solvency) perspective. In this section, we describe the components of the CAR and provide an algorithm for calculating it using market data.
The Absorption Ratio
We begin with a review of Kritzman et al. (2010) . The paper demonstrates an application of principal component analysis (PCA) to identifying periods of tight coupling in financial markets. (See the Appendix for a review of PCA.) The authors' methodology begins with the decomposition of m time series of market indices into their principal components. The authors then construct a measure, which they term the absorption ratio or AR, that they define as the percentage of variance explained by the first k (k ≈ m/5), principal components. The authors present evidence that (relatively) higher values of the AR often coincide with historical instances of market dislocation. Kritzman et al. (2010) also demonstrates that the AR can be used as the basis of a equity/fixed income portfolio switching strategy.
Calculating the absorption ratio
If X is an n×m data matrix (containing n observations on each of m time series), a common question arising in PCA is whether a smaller number, k, of principal components can be used to capture "most" of the underlying statistical structure in X, where k < m. In a sense, if this can be achieved, the first k principal components act as "metafactors" for the underlying statistical structure.
Various heuristics relating to the cumulative variance explained by the retained principal components have been developed for determining the minimum number, k, of principal components required to adequately span the original data space. For example, if σ 2 j , j = 1 . . . m is the percentage variance explained by the first j principal components, many sources recommend setting k = arg min
The absorption ratio makes use of a converse representation of PCA. Rather than determining how many principal components are required to explain a specific fraction of the total variance, the AR assumes a fixed number (k) of principal components and determines at any point in time the percentage of total variance explained, σ 2 k , by these k principal components. When σ 2 k is defined this way, it is equivalent to the AR. It is is the fraction of total variance explained (or absorbed) by a constant number of principal components, for a given set of asset classes:
where AR ≡ absorption ratio m ≡ number of indices k ≡ number of eigenvectors used to calculate the AR λ j ≡ variance of the j th eigenvector
In order to estimate the absorption ratio, Kritzman et al. (2010) uses a window of 500 days of index returns to estimate Σ, the covariance matrix of X, and then fixes k, the number of eigenvectors, at approximately m/5. In the empirical example, the authors select 51 U.S. industries, which correspond to k = 10 principal components. The underlying data values are indices from MSCI and estimation is done dynamically on trailing 500 day overlapping windows, over the period of January 1998-January 2010.
A high value of the absorption ratio implies that a large proportion of the movements of the individual indices is explained by a small number of economywide factors. Therefore, high AR values can be interpreted as indicating high levels of market fragility or potential systemic risk.
Importantly, Kritzman et al. (2010) observes that high systemic risk does not necessarily lead to asset depreciation or financial turbulence.
Extending the AR using a structural model of default
The class of structural credit models provides an economically motivated framework for valuing a firm's debt and equtiy as well as assesses the likelihood of firm default. Under the Merton model (Merton, 1974) , the assets of a firm evolve stochastically and cannot be observed, but can be valued based on other market observables. A key insight of the model is that the equity of the firm has the same payoffs to equity holders as a call option on the firm's assets, with a strike price equal to the face value of debt. Thus, at debt maturity the (equity) owners of the firm may elect either to pay back the debt or to default, thereby forfeiting future claims on the cash flows of the enterprise. Owners are incented to pay back debt when the value of the firm is greater than the value of the debt (the option is in the money) and to default when the value of the firm is less than the value of the debt. Succinctly, under the model, the default of a firm occurs when the value of its assets falls below the face value of its debt at maturity.
More formally, consider a firm, the balance sheet of which contains an amount D of zero coupon debt maturing at time T and amount E of common equity. Then the total assets of the firm, A, can be written:
Under the model, the market value of the firm's assets is assumed to follow geometric Brownian motion:
where µ A is the drift of the firm's assets and σ A is the asset volatility. The governing differential equation is then:
where r is the risk free rate. Finally, the volatility of the market value of the firm's assets, σ A , is related to the volatility of the firm's equity, σ E , through the firm's leverage (A/E) and the delta ∂E/∂A of the firm's equity with respect to its assets:
In our analysis, the insolvency of a financial institution is of particular interest and the structural framework provides a natural measure of a firm's probability of firm default, P D. Note again that under the model, equity holders only have an incentive to pay debt when there is residual firm value remaining after the debt is satisfied. Thus, the probability of the firm's assets being below the face amount of its debt exactly coincides with the probability that the firm will be insolvent. Under the model, the value of equity, E is equivalent to the value of a call option on the assets of the firm, struck at the face value of the liabilities:
where,
and Φ(·) is the cumulative normal distribution function. In this setting, the probability of default is given as:
Because all of a firm's assets are not traded publicly, we cannot directly obtain prices to compute firms' asset values. However, we can use (2)-(5) to solve for the unobservable asset value and volatilty of the firm, given the observable equity value, equity volatility, debt and risk-free rate:
For our purposes, we deiberately choose a generic form for f (·) in (8) since, in practice, a number of modifications are made to both the model and its estimation.
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An important observation in what follows it is that, assuming the levels of debt are relatively stable over moderate horizons, rapid declines in asset value will drive firms closer to default. If these asset value declines are tightly coupled, the result will be that many firms experience risk of default during the same time period.
Calculating the credit absorption ratio
We extend the absorption ratio of Kritzman et al. (2010) by introducing a number of modifications. Our focus is on the risk of the concomitant failure of key firms in the financial system. As our measure is primarily credit oriented, we modify both the formulation and estimation of the absorption ratio to suit this perspective and arrive at what we term the credit absorption ratio (CAR).
The most significant change to the problem formulation is that we replace the time series of market indices underlying Eq. (1) with time-series of asset returns for specific firms, estimated as in (8). In the language of the structural models discussed in Section 2.2, this formulation implies that we would expect the CAR to be higher during periods in which changes in the asset returns of firms may be more tightly coupled.
Because our goal is to explore the fragility of the financial system itself, we focus only on the asset returns of financial firms. Since we are focusing on a single sector, rather than a broad cross-section of asset classes as in Kritzman et al. (2010) , we set k = 1 in the calcuation of the CAR.
2 For technical convenience, we also use some standard smoothing approaches to facilitate the estimation of the CAR. We discuss these points in the remainder of this section.
Data preprocessing
Our implied asset return data estimates exhibit volatility, some of which may obscure the behavior we are seeking to observe. To gain clearer insight into the 1 In this paper, we use asset value estimates provided by Moody's Analytics. These are calculated using the Vasicek-Kealhoffer model (Kealhofer, 2003; Bohn and Stein, 2009 ). Of particular relevance is an extension that is specifically introduced to accommodate the unique business model of many financial firms. This business model creates a volatility profile that is different from many other corporations in that the firm volatility of a financial institution may be driven both by the volatility of the institution's financial portfolios as well as the volatility of the income derived from the substantial service franchises (e.g., underwriting and lending, issuance LOCs, etc.).
2 See Section 4.3 for a discussion of the sensitivity of the CAR to alternative values of k.
co-movement the asset return series, we find it useful to smooth the implied asset return series before calculating correlations. We begin by removing any observation that exhibits an asset return jump greater than 50%. (Note that we do not remove the entire series but only the single observation. Said differently, if the asset returns for a bank increase by more than 50% in a single month, we remove that month's asset return for that bank, but retain the remainder of the series.)
Next, we apply a moving average to the asset returns for each individual financial institution prior to estimating the covariance matrix. Importantly, in our implementation the moving average is backward looking which avoids a "look-ahead" bias.
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To estimate the CAR we require an estimate ofΣ. Numerically, we would prefer the covariance matrix to be of full rank so that the eigenvectors are orthogonal. However, in practice, due to missing values it is not uncommon for Σ not to be of full rank (which corresponds to one or more eigenvalues being zero) or to be nearly singular (i.e., for the condition number of the matrix to be high).
In our dataset, we encountered instances in which missing observations within a firm's time series of asset returns required that the firm be omitted from the calculation in one or more periods. For example, when two firms' time series have no overlap in the estimation window ending in time t, this results in missing "cells" in the correlation matrix for that time period. If the we forced inclusion of the firm with missing data, the CAR could not be calculated for time t. We elected instead to set a thershold for missingness for inclusion of a firm in its cohort in a given window period. Ideally, we would prefer a more stringent threshold that would include only time series with relatively few missing observations in a period's credit absorption ratio construction. However, setting the threshold for missingness too high would result in omitting a large number of firm series.
In light of this tension between inclusion and completeness, we set the threshold such that in each 36 month window ending in period t, the data set contained only those series for which 30 or more observations were non-missing data points. Thus CAR t was calculated using only time series with 30 or more observations in the period t − 36, . . . , t. 
A recipe for calculating CAR
In calculating the CAR we examine firms from a single broad sector (finance). To ensure robust estimation, and to provide a more sensitive measure, we only consider the first principal component in our calculation of the CAR. Thus,
where the variables are defined as the asset value analogs of the index data in (1). This gives the following recipe for calculating the credit absorption ratio at each time t:
CAR algorithm 1. Calculate the implied asset value series for each firm as in Eq. (8). 2. Calculate the asset return series for each firm: r τ = log Aτ Aτ−1 , τ = 2, . . . , T , where A τ is the implied value of the assets at time τ .
3. For t = ω + 1, . . . , T (a) Sort all firms in the data set by their implied asset value (converted into $US) at time t.
(b) Select the largest m firms.
(c) Filter and smooth the asset returns for each firm (as described in Section 2.3.1).
(d) EstimateΣ, the covariance matrix for the asset return data using ω months of data (τ = t − ω, . . . , t).
(e) CalculateR, the correlation matrix, as D
(f) Perform PCA usingR.
(g) Calculate CAR t as in (9).
In our empicial analysis, we calculated CAR t using the largest 50 firms in each region (m = 50). We estimated the CAR monthly using a 36 month rolling window (ω = 36, ∆t=one month) between January 1, 2002 and September 31, 2012.
Firm-specific exposures: PC loadings as a measure of firm-level exposure to systemic risk
In addition to calculating aggregate levels of systemic risk, we may use the CAR framework to explore the exposure of individual firms to systemic events. To do this, we examine the loadings of each firm on the first principal component (the eigenvalue of which corresponds to the CAR when k = 1). When the loading for a firm is large (in absolute value) this implies that the movements of the firm's asset values are highly correlated with movements in the first PC, which in turn implies higher sensitivity to the same factors that will influence many firms at the same time. Define x i as the time series of implied asset returns for the i th firm. For every x i in X, there exists a vector of loadings, γ i = {γ ij } = {q ji }, j = 1 . . . m on each of the m principal components. q ji is the i th element of the j th eigenvector q j (see the Appendix for more detailed notation). A larger positive or negative value of γ ij implies higher (in absolute value) partial correlation between the i th firm asset returns and j th principal component and a smaller value indicates lower (in absolute value) partial correlation.
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Because we estimate CAR over a 36 month rolling window, we can define γ ijt as the loading of the i th firm's asset returns in the j th principal component for the rolling window ending at time t. For ease of notation, and because we are considering only the first principal component in the calculation of the CAR, we set j = 1 and drop j from our notation in what follows.
We use the values of γ it to create firm-specific indices of firm-level exposure to systemic risk. We calculate the absolute value of the individual loadings in each month and then smooth these values using a 12 month moving average.
We then defineγ it as:γ it = 1 12
In other words,γ it is a 12 month (backward) moving average of firm i's absolute loadings. It measures the degree to which the asset value of firm i are correlated with the first principal component controlling for the returns of all other firms in the cohort. To the extent that the value ofγ it is increasing, it provides some indication of an increased exposure to a key potential systemic factor. We interpret increases (decreases) inγ it as increases (decreases) in the susceptibility of firm i to a systemic movement, should one occur, at time t.
3 Empirical results
In this section, we describe the results of calculating the CAR using data on the largest financial firms in the United States, Europe and across all markets (Global).
The data
We used monthly data on implied asset values provided by Moody's Analytics (MA). MA uses a proprietary algorithm to calculate implied asset values and implied asset volatility (see Kealhofer (2003) for a discussion and also Footnote 1.). 7 We used OANDA Corporation data on exchange rates 8 for converting asset values to US dollars.
5 Eigenvector elements show relative importance of the various banks' returns in the determination of the first principal component, but are otherwise not informative about the properties of the principal component.
6 See Section 4.4 for a discussion of alternative formulations ofγ it . 7 Note that while MA relies upon a proprietary algorithm, the input data is publicly available and other, albeit less widely used, algorithms exist for estimating asset value from this data.
8 http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/ Our raw data set contained time series of monthly firm asset values in the period January, 2002 to September, 2012. We included only financial firms, as defined by MA. These included banks and investment banks, but also insurance companies, broker dealers, etc. In total, our data set contained 9,611 firms that had at least one observation during the study period. Our data spans 129 monthly periods. We filtered out firms with fewer than 30 non-missing observations (out of 129) which resulted in 7,756 firms in our working data set.
We began our analysis by defining the largest financial institutions in each population of study (EU, US, and Global). To accommodate changes in the levels of assets of financial institutions over time, we rank ordered the financial institutions by size (implied market value of assets) on a monthly basis and redefined the constituents of each cohort based on the rankings. Thus, for example, smaller institutions that grew in size over the period of study would not be inappropriately included in the calculation of the CAR in earlier periods. To ensure comparability of assets across regions, we performed a conversion to US dollars using contemporaneous FOREX rates through December 2012.
The aggregate behavior of the CAR in the period 2005-2012
We begin with an examination of the behavior of the credit absorption ratio for various market segments. We estimated time series of CAR t values for data sets composed of the 50 largest financial institutions in the US and Europe and globally. We report our analysis of the largest 50 firms, although we performed similar analysis using cohorts of size 20 with similar results. Figure 1 shows time series of the the CAR for each of the three cohorts we study. Each is estimated monthly over 36 month rolling windows between January 1, 2002 and September 31, 2012. Figure 2 shows each series individually, along with indications of the timing of some of the key events over the observation period. We discuss the behavior of CAR in the European cohort in detail as it highlights some of the useful features of the CAR. After this, we briefly discuss the US CAR series as well, Movements in the EU CAR align with well publicized events during the financial crisis such as the suspension by BNP Paribas of three investment funds due to their high exposure to US subprime mortgages (August 2007) and the Bank of England's grant of emergency funding to Northern Rock, the fifth largest UK mortgage lender, due to the inability of Northern Rock to secure credit from other sources (September 2007).
However, it is striking that the increasing fragility of the European financial system, as measured by the CAR, become evident in mid-2005, and that by mid-2006 a strong trend was present. This trend reached its peak in late 2006, somewhat earlier than the first reports of stresses in the U.S. subprime market (in mid-2007) , and about a year or so earlier than the full onset of the global crisis.
The sources of this increased fragility are not fully clear. However, in hindsight, a number of factors may have contributed. First, the years 2004-2005 saw the admission and integration of 10 new countries into the European Union. At this time, however, many of the new members (and some of the existing ones) exhibited financial profiles that violated the agreed-upon standards for EU participation, as defined by Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
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In late March 2005, the Council of the European Union relaxed the criteria for SGP insolvency. This allowed some of the countries, previously found to be SGP insolvent (Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Malta, Poland and Slovakia), to obtain a decision abrogating the previous evaluation of thier financial status, while postponing further Council actions for others (Greece and Hungary).
10 Because of this decision, SGP-insolvent countries were able to remain in the EU and were, by virtue of membership, allowed to access low interbank rates.
Furthermore, over the period of 2006-2008 EU central bankers began cutting key interest rates, eventually reducing them to historical lows. These measures resulted in lower bank funding costs even though at this time there was an ongoing reduction of sovereign solvency protection in the European financial system resulting from the relaxation of the SGP. Previous authors have observed a strong relationship between interbank rates (which EU banks prefer to alternative funding sources such as deposits) and both retail rates banks set on loans and deposits (Banerjee et al., 2010) and C&I rates that banks set for commercial loans (Kwan, 2010) . Lending to the non-financial corporate sector increased over this period and through 2010 as corporate borrowers continued to draw down existing bank credit lines. For many corporations, bank borrowing was preferable to funding in the capital markets which became increasingly expensive (European Commission, 2009 ). Thus, the availability of low interbank rates coupled with the relaxation of credit standards and increased demand for C&I loans 11 appears to be one vector of increased fragility in the European financial system at this time.
The increase in C&I lending during this period also appears to coincide with the rise in the EU CAR series. Figure 3 below shows the three year rise in non-financial corporate lending (which was primary attributable to utilization 9 The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is an agreement concluded by the European Council in 1996 to govern financial stability of the member states of the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU. The original 1996 rules stated that the Council should immediately start an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) with respect to any member whose public expenditures exceed its revenues by more than 3% of GDP in a given year. In addition, governments were prohibited from having total government debt in excess of 60% of GDP. The SGP also contained an exception clause that protected members if these deficits resulted from "severe economic downturn," defined as an annual fall of real GDP of 2% or more. While increased in C&I lending appears to be an underlying factor for the EU CAR, US C&I lending and CAR exhibit a different relationship. As shown in Figure 4 , until the very end of the financial crisis of 2008-2009, US banks continued underwriting new C&I loans at an increasing pace.
12 It thus appears that in the US, the systemic fragility may have been driven less by overdrafts on existing credit lines by commercial borrowers. Said differently, although C&I lending tracks the CAR closely in Europe, the same relationship does not hold in the US, where it appears other factors were driving systemic risk. 15 The US CAR remains elevated for the next several years.
Examples of firm-specific exposures to systemic risk in the period 2005-2012
In addition to measuring the potential for aggregate and regional systemic events, it can be useful to consider the degree to which individual firms could be exposed to a systemic events, should one materialize. As we described in Section 2.4, we can take advantage of the same broad framework used to calculate the CAR and use it to evaluate firm-specific exposures as well. By way of example, we discuss three financial institutions -two in the EU and one in the US. It is noteworthy that in these casesγ it often provided an 15 A number of factors may have contributed to this fact. For example, in 2012 it was reported that interest rates themselves may have been artificially low in US. In April 2012 Schwab filed a lawsuit against 16 major global banks accusing them of suppressing the LIBOR rate over the period [2008] [2009] . According to the complaint, the 16 major global banks misrepresented their true cost of borrowing, used in the USD LIBOR calculation. In addition, the lawsuit alleges that the USD LIBOR had been manipulated as early as in 2006 (Fineman, 2012) . Given that 60% of prime and nearly of all subprime US mortgage were indexed to LIBOR in 2008, such LIBOR rate manipulation, if it occurred, could have obscured the risk profile of some financial institutions. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/ 2012/07/05/explainer-why-the-libor-scandal-is-a-bigger-deal-than-jpmorgan) indication of systemic exposure in the period preceding the various events that affected these respective institutions. However, before presenting our analysis, we also note that there were a number of cases in which interpretation of thẽ γ it series for a firm was not as straightforward as in our examples. To this end, a more rigorous analysis would be required to more fully evaluate utility of this type of measure. Put under FHFA management Foreclosure suspension lifted Bailout limit doubled Unlimited funds announced Alleged to take short position in its own subprime 16 This coincides with the minor drop in theγ t series. Freddie received $100 Billion as a (first) bailout and in exchange, the US Treasury received warrants worth 80% of the firm's common stock. Freddie Mac continued to take on additional subprime debt through 2008 and itsγ t series continued to rise high through 2008 and into early 2009 when Freddie Mac lifted its suspension on mortgage foreclosures. Subsequent to this, the limits of the Federal bailout fund were increased to $200 Billion and theγ t series begins to decline, eventually falling below 0.1.
Example 1: Freddie Mac
For the three years following the lifting of the bailout caps on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Treasury guaranteed Freddie and Fannie losses. About three years after the cap was lifted, we observe another rapid rise in Freddie Mac'sγ t series. In early 2012 members of the media began investigating Freddie Mac's alleged recent practice of denying refinancing to some homeowners whose current mortgage rates, set in the period leading up to the housing bubble, were higher than the then current rates. This may have increased the likelihood of those borrowers defaulting.
17 At the same time, it was reported that the firm took short positions on mortgages assets.
18 This investigation is ongoing. The increase in the firm'sγ t series appears to coincide with these alleged activities. Theγ t series for Dexia, N.V./S.A., is shown in Figure 6 . In the lead-up to the crisis, Dexia had extensive exposure, both in Europe and the US, to several asset classes that subsequently became distressed. In particular, Dexia had e3.4bn of exposure to Greek government bonds. In addition, it has been estimated that the bank had e17.5bn of exposure to sovereign debt issued by Italy, Spain, Portugal and other distressed European sovereigns. 19 In the US Dexia also had $6.2 billion in subprime exposures (P&I + NIM) through its subsidiary FSA, the bond insurer.
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Beginning in 2004, Dexia began reducing its exposure to subprime assets, replacing these with prime positions, though in 2005 Dexia purchased $1 billion of residential mortgage-backed securities which turned out to be of low quality. Around this same time, in mid-2005, Dexia'sγ t series began a steady upward trend that continued through early 2007, when it plateaued at almost 100% and where it remained until mid-2009. During the period of 2007-early 2009 the governments of Belgium, France, and Luxemburg provided capital infusions to Dexia. However, the quality of both the firm's mortgage portfolios and its sovereign debt portfolio continued to deteriorate (see footnote 19).
In mid-September 2009, the Belgian, French and Luxembourg governments renewed their state guarantees of Dexia for a period of one year. The timing of this extension corresponds to the period in whichγ t begins to decline, from about 100% to about 80%. Finally, in October 2011, when the French and Belgian governments decide to split Dexia into a "good bank" and "bad bank," (with the "bad bank," receiving government underwriting from both governments), Dexia'sγ t begin to decline, eventually approaching zero about a year later. Announce subprime losses higher than expected Government takes 43% equity stake Government increases stake to 65% of equity Irish and other EU sovereign spreads widen Auctions off a very large distressed portfolio Theγ t series for Lloyds Banking Corporation is shown in Figure 7 . In the leadup to the financial crisis, Lloyds was one of the largest UK-based commercial banks. The bank also had a large portfolio of subprime exposures. Beginning in early 2006 we observe a significant increase in the Lloydsγ t series. Around the same time, the firm experienced the first wave of losses on its subprime portfolio (in early 2007 Lloyds revealed these losses to be higher than expected).
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However, the situation with the subprime portfolio continued to deteriorate as the subprime crisis unfolded further. In October 2008, the firm announced its takeover of HBOS, the largest U.K. mortgage lender. Around the same time, the U.K government announced that it would take an equity stake in Lloyds (among other banks that were deemed systemically important). The government took a 43% equity position in the bank February 2009 but then increased its stake to 65% in March 2009.
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Athough Lloydsγ t series remained at about 80% from 2008 through the beginning of January 2009, it begins to rapidly decline after the government's second equity purchase, eventually declining to levels below 20%.
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In first quarter of 2010, Lloydsγ t again start to exhibit an upward trend. This aligns with the period when Lloyds portfolio of Irish loans, with a large proportion of mortgages, started to lose its value. Lloyds inherited a large portfolio of Irish loans during its acquisition of HBOS. Through 2010, Lloyds positions on Irish loans reportedly lost £4.3 Billion 24 and continued to deteriorate in early 2011. Starting from mid-2010, yields on the Irish government debt continued to rise, in part on expectations that Irish government would have to seek another bailout.
25 In November 2010, European officials announced that Ireland would receive e85 Billion bailout.
26 . Despite these measures, Ireland was downgraded to non-investment-grade status in mid-July 2011 as Lloyd'sγ t continued to rise. Lloydsγ t started to decrease only in early 2012, soon after it reportedly sold over £900 in mortgage-backed loans to the Lone Star Funds (portfolio known as a "Project Royal") and started to market "Project Royal II" at around £750 Million.
27 Both of the portfolios were sold at a significant impairment, 40% and 82%, 28 respectively.
Discussion
In this section we discuss in more detail the behavior and estimation of the CAR measure as well as offering some caveats on interpretation.
Comparison to Kritzman, et al (2010)
The results of Kritzman et al. (2010) are broadly consistent with our own findings. In constructing the Global AR Kritzman et al. (2010) use returns from a cohort of firms in 42 countries as well as a number of regional indicies. Though the populations are different, we compare the Global CAR to the Global AR.
23 The government purchase of Lloyds equity, under European Commission competition laws, was considered to be a form of state aid. As a result, the group was required to sell a portion of its business. The European commission and Lloyds agreed that the assets to be sold would include: Lloyds retail banking business with at least 600 branches, a 4.6% share of the personal current accounts market in the UK and up to approximately 19% of the banks' mortgage assets. These divested assets would be operated under a new brand (Banham, 2010) . Both the Global AR and the Global CAR indicate a significant increase in market fragility in the period 2007 through mid/end-2009. However, due to differences in (a) the underlying data series (financial firm implied asset values for CAR vs. a highly diversified basket of market indices for AR) and (b) estimation horizon (36 months for CAR vs. 500 days for AR), the two approaches also produce different behaviors in some cases.
In particular, the CAR exhibits more variability than the AR. For example, in early 2006, the AR exhibits an upward trend that is relatively monotonic (see Kritzman et al., 2010, Exhibit 15) . While the Global CAR exhibits a similar general trend during this period, it experiences a pronounced plateau for a period in 2007. There are three notable peaks in the CAR series: in mid-2006, late 2008/early 2009 and early 2012. It is unclear what explains the higher variability of the CAR, but it may be due to the CAR's exposure to only the financial sector in contrast to the AR, which is based on multiple industrial and financial markets and thus represents a broader based and longer term trend.
The CAR uses a longer time window (36 months vs. 500 days, or about double the length). However, it appears that during the period of study, the signal derived from the CAR becomes pronounced earlier than the one derived from the AR. We believe that these differences may again be the result of differences in the composition of the information used in calculating the two measures. Specifically, by examining only financial institutions and using a credit-based measure, CAR seems to have more specifically reflected the fragility of the financial network in the most recent crisis. The AR also identifies this fragility, but becomes more pronounced when impact of the systemic risk has been disseminated to broader diversified markets.
It could be argued that these findings are consistent with the notion of the AR as representing a general and broader view of the financial system, while the CAR represents a sector view, albeit of the primary sector of interest to policy makers and regulators. Said differently, the AR is an indication of the convergence of a greater number of sectors and represents potentially more widespread concentration, while the CAR provides a warning of potential solvency issues specific to the financial sector.
Relationship of CAR to other measures
In this section we compare the CAR to implied asset returns -the underlying data used to calculate the CAR -and to the V IX to examine whether there is evidence that the CAR contains additional information not found in either of these series. Figure 8 (top) depicts the behavior of the Global CAR composed of 50 largest institutions (globally) in our sample plotted against the median asset returns for the sample over the same period. In examining the figure, no obvious visual pattern is evident.
For example, during the 2005-mid-2006 period, asset returns increase as the CAR generally increases (nonmonotinically). However, asset returns decline rapidly from mid-2006 through the end of 2008, while the CAR remains quite high. In the 2009-2010 period, the CAR series declines rapidly, while the asset series rises modestly, but remains low. Finally, the rise in CAR over the period June 2010-February 2012 corresponds to almost no change in median asset returns. These observations suggest that, while the CAR incorporates implied asset returns in its estimation, it measures something distinct from them. We also examined the CAR relative to the V IX, an index of the implied volatility of options on the S&P 500 (sometimes referred to as the "fear index"). Figure 8 (bottom) plots the global CAR against the VIX. As in the case of the asset returns, we have smoothed the series over a twelve month window. From the figure, it appears that both measures begin to rise prior to the onset of the crisis. However, unlike the CAR, the VIX series does not rise at in earlier periods (2005 and 2006) . The CAR begins to increase in the beginning of 2010 and continues to do so until early 2012, suggesting heightened systemic risk preceding the downgrade of Greek sovereign debt to junk and multiple bailout packages by EU to Greece, Ireland and later Portugal. This again suggests that the CAR provides information that is distinct from that contained in the VIX. Even the US CAR series, which should exhibit more localized behavior (recall that the VIX is an index of volatility of the S&P500), and which began rising around the same time as the VIX, does not appear to proxy the CAR. For example, after it began rising in 2007, the VIX declined precipitously in 2010.
In contrast, the US CAR remained near crisis levels through 2012.
We investigated these series more formally by performing tests for Granger causality (Granger, 1979) at lags of two, three, four, five, six, nine and twelve months. The key questions we explored related to whether (a) the VIX Granger causes the (US) CAR and (b) whether asset values in a region Granger cause the CAR in that region.
The results, not shown here, provide no evidence a causal relationship from VIX to the US CAR (though there is some evidence of causality from US CAR to VIX at about a six month lag).
The asset return results, on the other hand, paint a more complicated picture. We find that in the US there appears to be a feedback loop: the CAR and asset returns lead each other (significant at a 5% level) at short horizions up to about a quarter. A weaker feedback loop is also evidenced at about a five or six month horizion: asset returns lead the CAR and vice versa, though at some lags, the CAR lead is weaker statistically (though still significant at about 10% level). We find little evidence of causal relationships between asset retunrs and the CAR in the other regions.
The usual caveats apply in that these results do not imply that the changes, e.g., in the US asset returns that declined precipitously in 2010, are the consequence of changes of CAR. Rather, we can only conclude that there is a statistically demonstrable precedence in movements of the various series which may result from common unobserved factors, direct causality or some other source. We also note that there is overlap in the population of the Global cohort and those of both the US and EU cohorts. Figure 9 shows that over time, the composition of the Global cohort shifted from about 60% EU firms and 35%US firms (with minimal non-EU, non-US financial institutions included) to about 50% EU firms, 30% US firms and 20% firms from other regions. While it would have been cleaner econometricaly to keep these populations distinct, for practical purposes, it is valuable to have a global measure of systemic risk in addition to region-specific ones.
Sensitivity to alternative values of k
Because our anaysis focuses on the financial sector, the correlation among the firms that make up the CAR in various cohorts is higher than would be the case in examining a broad cross-section of industrial firms. For this reason, we have calculated the CAR using only the first eignevalue from the PCA analysis (i.e., k = 1). This is at variance with the recommendation of Kritzman et al. (2010) , who suggest a value of k ≈ m/5, which in our case would imply k ≈ 10.
In this subsection, we provide some insight into our rationale for choosing k = 1 and also demonstrate the sensitivity of our results to the value of k. Figure 10 shows alternative calculations of the CAR, using k = 2, 3, 4 and 5. The upper left frame shows the CAR as it is currently calculated, while the remaining four frames show calculations using progressively higher values of k. As can be seen from the figure, and as expected, the mean level of the CAR increases with the inclusion of each additional principal component. We also note that as additional PCs are added, the CAR series themselves become smoother and flatter. It appears that adding additional PCs serves to mute the behavior of the CAR series. This is particularly pronounced in the case of the Global CAR series. While the local behavior of this series is preserved to some degree (note the small peaks in 2005 and 2007) , the global behavior is attenuated (the broad increasing trend from 2005 to 2007 flattens out). In fact, the behavior of the Global CAR is notably flatter, even in moving from k = 1 to k = 2.
Interestingly, though the global behavior of all CAR series becomes muted as additional PCs are added, the global behavior of the EU and U S series remains pronounced as PCs are added. In fact, the general shapes of the EU and U S series do not appear affected by the addition of additional PCs. This suggests that for the regional CAR series, much of the information can be extracted using the first PC. On the other hand, adding PCs, up to 2 or 3, does not appear to degrade the regional series too much. Some researchers may prefer larger values of k on the theory that additional sources of risk may be captured by additional PCs in different settings.
The impact of additional PCs on the Global CAR series, on the other hand, appears to be greater. One reason for this may be that the global cohort loads more evenly on several the PCs, rather than primarily on the first, perhaps due to the regional heterogeneity in the cohort.
Scalingγ it
In Section 2.4, we definedγ it as the susceptibility of firm i to a systemic event at time t, should one occur. An alternative measure, similar to the eigenvector centrality has been proposed by (Kinlaw et al., 2012) . In this paper, the loadings are scaled and normalized by the importance of each PC.
We construct a similar measureγ s it which we define asγ it scaled by the value of CAR t :γ
Heuristically,γ s it may be interpreted as the time t potential for a systemic event that affects firm i. Note that this contrasts with the interpretation of γ it , which we interpret as the time t exposure if firm i to a systemic event, conditional on an event occurring. In our examples, we did not observe very large qualitative differences in the two measures, though some differences did emerge, particulary during periods when the CAR was at lower levels. Figure  11 shows these results graphically for the example firms we discussed in Section 3.3. In general, and as expected, the relative values differ when the CAR moves significantly. On the margin, sinceγ s it addresses the potential for a systemic event affecting a given firm, it may be of more interest to policy makers, whilẽ γ it , with its focus on absolute susceptibility, may be of more interest to bank managers and chief risk officers in their strategic thinking.
Generality of the CAR
One of the more interesting properties of the CAR is that it seems to identify a variety of dynamics relating to different underlying factors in different market settings. In hindsight:
• the CAR in the EU mirrored closely increased lending to the C&I sector (though this relationship did not hold in the US);
• the CAR in the US appeared to be inversely related to asset returns (though for only a portion of the period examined); and
• the CAR in the US also increased as did equity market volatility (though for only a portion of the period examined).
This generality may be interpreted as either a "feature" or a "bug" depending one's perspective. On the one hand, it is not hard to argue that the correspondence of movements in the CAR to other series, known in hindsight to be contributors to the financial crisis, may simply be data snooping.
On the other hand, the fact that the CAR does not track any one underlying factor suggests that it may be a more general tool for monitoring fragility. The CAR measures the degree to which different financial institutions' asset values move together statistically. High values of the CAR may be interpreted as a general signal that there is a higher potential for a systemic event because many firms are engaging in common behaviors, using similar portfolio constructions and trading strategies or being impacted more strongly by the same macroeconomic factors. This signal may be present even before the exact nature or identity of these drivers is known or when there are multiple drivers at play.
Caveats
We have suggested that the CAR can be used as one indicator of systemic fragility and that it may also provide insight into the exposure of individual firms to the factors underlying this fragility. However, our results should be interpreted in the context of some limitations in our study.
The most obvious limitation in our work is the use of only the last decade of data in our analysis. Ideally, we would have used a longer time series, as did Kritzman et al. (2010) . Doing so would have permitted us to examine the behavior and effectiveness of the CAR during other historical periods, both containing other crises and more quiescent periods.
29 However, because we do not have longer time series, it is possible that our analysis reflects an idiosyncratic set of behaviors that were unique to the recent crisis. (This may be particularly so of the causality analysis we report in Section 4.2.) Although the CAR appears to identify several distinct periods of fragility in our data, it could be argued that we have examined only a "single" event. Economic motivation notwithstanding, absent additional data, we cannot be certain that what we observe does not reflect some other phenomena.
Another potential limitation in our approach is the data we use itself. Although our methodology restricts the data used to calculate CAR t to only those observations occurring at time t or earlier, the data we used undergoes a rigorous quality assurance process and as errors are found in the underlying data sources used to estimate the implied asset value of firms (e.g., financial statements from data providers or restatements of accounting corrections by CFOs), these errors are corrected in the databases that feed the asset value calculations. This means that some of the underlying data used in our calculations could be different than the data that would have been available at the time. According to the data provider, a small percentage of the financial statement data is restated each month to correct errors, or to replace preliminary financial statements with final ones. While such challenges are not unique to our approach, we highlight them nonetheless. This occurs rarely (less that 0.6% of the time), but could conceivably affect our results.
Somewhat more substantively perhaps, is that the methodology for calculating the implied asset values was revised towards the beginning of our historical window. The data we were provided contained reestimated asset values for the full sample period, using the new methodology. Analysts prior to the revision would have observed alternative asset values in some cases. However, because the asset values were reestimated across all firms and the data were revised for the full sample period, we do not expect that the timing of the change itself should have introduced substantial artifacts into our analysis, though it did result in a data set in which not all of the data at the beginning of our sample would have had the same values as they do today.
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, although the CAR is at its core a statistical measure, the economic motivation for the CAR is primarily creditrelated and, more specifically, solvency-related. Concerns about solvency were prominent in the recent crisis and these risks appear to be reasonably well captured by the CAR. However, other constraints, beyond credit, have also lead to crises and will likely do so in the future. It is less clear how well the CAR will perform in such settings. Our primary economic arguments have focused on the relationship between asset value and systemic fragility that may or may not result in the default of individual financial institutions. While other risk factors, such as liquidity, should in principle be priced into the asset value of a financial institution, it is not clear how efficiently this takes place or with what speed. Thus, our caveats about the CAR are amplified in the case of non-credit phenomena and the viability of using the CAR for identifying these other types of systemic fragility has not been determined.
This also suggests experimentation with various values of k. In situations in which a number of factors may be driving comovements in asset values, focusing only on the first PC may provide counterintuitive signals as shifts in loadings from a single primary component to, say two primary components, each with about equal weight, could appear to be a decrease in the CAR for k = 1. While this does not seem to be the case in our sample (see Figure 10) , it could potentially occur in other settings.
Conclusion
We have introduced a new method for monitoring systemic risk using implied asset returns from publicly traded financial institutions. We call our new measure the credit absorption ratio (CAR) and it is defined as the fraction of the total variance in a set of financial institutions' asset returns that is explained by the first principal component of the data. Higher values of the CAR suggest higher levels of risk concentration and fragility in the financial sector, and lower values suggest that the sector may be less vulnerable to a systemic solvency event.
Throughout most of the period we studied, we found that the asset movements of the largest financial institutions within the financial system tended to be closely related during periods of stress (as evidenced by high values of CAR). This suggests that during this period, the factors driving changes in asset values for the largest financial institutions were relatively compact and that this high concentration of risk was shared broadly across market participants. A natural implication of this concentration is that during such periods, financial institutions are more vulnerable to dislocation, because the impact of shocks to underlying drivers of risk may be quickly transmitted across many institutions.
Even so, we found that the exposure of different financial institutions to systemic risk varied across institutions and across time. We demonstrated how the individual loadings to the principal component underlying the CAR calculations can provide information about the exposure of some institutions to systemic risk at different points in time. For example, our examination of several financial institutions that became distressed during the crisis showed that the firm-specific factor loading increased markedly prior to the firms' difficulties. These increases in factor loadings were often observed in our data at least several months or more prior to key events.
Our results also suggest that the CAR measures something different than either the VIX or than asset returns. For example, while median asset returns are negatively correlated at times with the CAR, during other periods, they are relatively uncorrelated or even slightly positively correlated. Furthermore, in most regions, there was no evidence of (statistical) causality between asset values and the CAR and market volatility in the US was not a driver of increases in the US CAR.
Nonetheless, the various limitations in the current study, outlined in Section 4.6, suggest caution in interpreting our findings too strongly. The empirical results we presented are encouraging but also point towards a number of avenues for additional research and empirical exploration. We hope to pursue a some of these in future work.
Despite these caveats, our preliminary empirical evidence suggest that the CAR may hold promise as an addition to the emerging suite of metrics and tools for monitoring and measuring the potential for systemic events. The CAR can be calculated from publicly available data. Because the approach to calculating the CAR provides insight both into periods of overall systemic fragility and into the specific financial institutions that may be most exposed to the risks that this fragility engenders, it can be used in a variety of contexts of interest to both regulators and market participants.
Appendix: PCA
By way of review, consider a n × m data matrix X containing n observations on m variables of interest (e.g., individual banks' implied asset returns). For ease of notation, assume the data have been centered by subtracting from each observation the mean vector so that the resulting observations have mean zero. Also assume that X has a full rank.
Denote by Σ the covariance matrix 30 of X. Then,
The objective of the analysis is to find an orthogonal matrix P that transforms X into Z = XP such that covariance matrix of Z, Σ Z = 1 n Z Z, is diagonal. The columns of P are termed the characteristic vectors of X, and the transformed variables Z are called principal components.
The principal components are orthogonal to each other and collectively explain all of the variance in the original data matrix X. By convention, the first principal component explains maximum variance possible. The second principal component explains maximum of the remaining variability (not explained by the first principal component) and so on.
Σ Z can be expressed as in Σ:
which re-casts the original problem as diagonalization of the covariance matrix of X. Since Σ is symmetric, it is diagonalized by an orthogonal matrix of its eigenvectors, i.e.
where E is a matrix of eigenvectors arranged in columns and D is a diagonal matrix with the corresponding eigenvalues on the main diagonal. The eigenvalues will be non-negative, since Σ is positive semi-definite. Setting P = E yields the solution to the principal component problem:
30 In practice, correlation matrix is often used in place of the covariance matrix. This is done primarily for purposes of interpretability. If the variables in X were normalized to have not only mean zero but also unit variance, the covariance matrix naturally is equivalent to the correlation matrix. Alternatively, using the correlation matrix in place of the covariance matrix may be viewed as using weighted PCA with weights given by the inverse of the variables' variances.
Σ Z = P ΣP = P PDP P = (P P) D (P P)
The eigenvectors are inherently non-unique. We select a specific matrix of eigenvectors Q such that each eigenvector has unit length. Denote the associated diagonal matrix of eigenvalues Λ = diag (λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . , λ m ). The eigenvalues represent the amount of variance explained by the corresponding principal component.
PCA may be used as a form of dimensionality reduction in that a smaller number of orthogonal eigenvectors may be used as a basis for the original data space. This reduction may be achieved by retaining only the eigenvectors that are most useful in explaining the variance in the original data. To do this, the eigenvectors are ranked by their eigenvalues. The first principal component is the linear combination of index weights weighted by the elements of the first eigenvector and explains the greatest fraction of the asset returns' total variance. The second principal component is the linear combination of asset returns weights orthogonal to the first principal component that explains the greatest fraction of the remaining asset returns' variance, and so forth.
